Abstract Recent publications have reached conicting conclusions on wheather allowing users to have unlimitted free access for downloading music and lms is benetial or not for the content provider industrty. Not only do models dier in their conclusions, but there has also not been an agreement on the validity of data on the impact of free access to music and lms using P2P on the prots of CPIs and on the demand for CDs and DVDs. We provide in this paper a model that allows to study this question using elementary mathematical tools. In particular, it includes the eect of sampling on the the willingness to buy. Preliminary numerical experiments show that benets are maximized by avoiding any control measures against unauthorized sampling over P2P networks.
Introduction
Fast evolution of the P2P technology in last years has increased the wide spread access to popular culture (music and lms). It has promoted le sharing at the expense of free riding. This evolution created a major conict between internautes and content provider industry. While a legal battle is being held in courts and in the legislation area, the conict also nds its echoes in scientic analysis of experimental data and of the economy of P2P networks. In particular, some publications conclude that the music and lm industry gains from P2P where as other conclude the contrary. The gains can be attributed to a sampling eect:
by downloading music, a customer can get more information that may increase its willingness to purchase a hard copy of the CD. On the other hand, the availability of free copies for download considerably decreases the demand for costly electronic copies sold by the companies and may constitute for many users a satisfactory alternative to the original CD thus decreasing again the incomes of the content providers industry 1 . 1 According to the 2009 IFPI [1] , by 2008 its 3.7 billion dollars digital music business model had, on an international level, a 25% estimated growth. The RIAA [2] reported that sales of digital music have grown in 2008 by 30%, which represents 1.6 billion dollars, and constituted 32% (shipments) of the total market value and 2.7 billion dollars in total sales. The market for physical recorded music have fallen 28% to 5.8 billion dollars.
The aim of this paper is rst to propose an economic model that predicts the impact of the P2P networks on the access to culture on the one hand, and on the incomes of the content providers industry (CPI) on the other. In particular we aim at understanding the impact of actions of the CPI on these two performance measures. Based on the economic model, we identify numerically conditions for win-win business models in which CPIs can see their benet increase while increasing the accessibility to music and lms.
We consider the following two categories of actions that can be taken by the CPI:
1. Sampling: Making contents available for download at their own site at a cost that they can determine.
2. Measures against unauthorized downloads: Investment in ghting (e.g.
in courts) against non-authorized downloads.
We provide in the next section an overview of the economic aspects of sampling and of legal measures againsnt unauthorized downloads. We then introduce an economic model and compute the expected income of CPI taking into account the impact of their actions on the availability of the les at the P2P networks, on the demand for sampling of the le and for purchasing it.
Sampling and Legagl Measures against Downloads
Thanks to new technologies such as P2P networks, consumers have found tools that allow them to freely explore, choose, listen and select what music to purchase. Sampling has escaped from the monopolistic control of the music producer as an advertisement strategy, and has positioned itself in the hands of consumers.
We provide below a sohrt overview on the legal and economic aspects of sampling.
The discussion of sampling at American jurisprudence
After the RIAA tried to sue more than 30,000 individual le sharers since 2003 [3] , the CPI has changed judicial harassment for a concerted strategy with Government and ISPs that, by using cease and desist letters, seeks to discourage le sharing with the threat of Internet service suspension. Still, we will review the two main legal cases in American jurisprudence that have looked at the subject of sampling. In A&M Records et al. v Napster [4] , the defendant argued that its users, in a behavior that resembled fair use, sampled several musical products to make a decision on what to purchase. The Court concluded that sampling is commercial in nature, can not be done by consumers without the producer's authorization, and, hence, can not be identied as fair use. Napster, based on [5] , even appealed on the positive eects that sampling creates on the market.
The Court of Appeals again agreed with the plaintis, for whom le-sharing not only hurts CD sales, but also blocks the new markets which the copyright own- 
Eects of sampling on sales: theoretical and empirical results
Experience goods [11] identify assets that need to be consumed before knowing their satisfaction level. Consumers make an initial selection based on information from indirect sources and will continue testing until the cost of a new trial exceeds the expected growth in satisfaction. Peitz and Waelbroeck [12] , assuming that music is an experience good, argue that P2P networks oer the possibility of sampling in music. In their basic model the benets obtained by the CPI can be increased due to a more informed consumer which would be willing to pay more for albums he really wants to buy. In an extended model, prots will grow even with lower prices of the albums, thanks to savings the CPI would have in costs of marketing and promotion.
Liebowitz [13, 14] opposes this position and, based on data collected by the CPI on sales of CDs, argues that the growth of le sharing through P2P networks is the cause of the fall in per capita album sales. To him, sampling simply gives the consumer a more accurate view of his musical taste, but it does not increase his music buying level [15] . Countering RIAA's argument, Liebowitz believes that downloading an album can not be correlated with one or more unsold albums, and a replacement rate of about 5 to 6 CD's downloaded per each unsold CD is more realistic. Analysis made on surveys using dierent methodologies agree that sampling hurts music sales. Rob and Waldfogel [16] , interviewed college students in the United States, nding this impact close to 9%. Michel [17] and Hong [18] , based on data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), found a drop in sales of 13% and 7.6% respectively. Using data from the European Consumer Technographics survey, Zentner [19] concludes that le-sharing reduces the probability of buying music by 30%, and music sales by 7.8%.
On the other side, using data from German college students, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf [20] could not nd a direct relationship between le-sharing and declining sales of CD's, obtaining an eect "statistically indistinguishable from zero". A more recent study [21] commissioned by the Dutch government, argues that even when buying and le-sharing sometimes go hand in hand, they are not mutually exclusive, i.e., there is no direct relationship between downloading les protected by copyright and purchasing music in physical format . One of the ndings points that le sharers are not more or less willing to buy music that other people, and those le sharers that buy music do not buy more or less music than non le sharers, but they acquire more value added products, like concert tickets and promotional items (licensing ).
Andersen and Frenz [22] , analyzing microdata from the Canadian population as a whole, concluded that there is no clear evidence to say that le sharing aects music sales. However, the group that shares les has a clear positive relationship between the number of downloads per month and music CD's buying, of about 0.44 albums bought for each album this group downloads . Furthermore, they observe a negative indirect inuence of album prices in album sales. Price, along assortment of authors, performers and genres (even those not available in traditional stores), and desire to discover new music, is also the main factor that pushes the consumer to download music instead of buying CD's, according to
Sanduly [23] , who in a study based on the Spanish music market, nds a "strong heterogeneity" in the relationship between the consumption of music via P2P
networks and the consumption of music through physical format (CD's).
P2P business model for the CPI
Dene U to be the set of policies available for the CPI for impacting the demand. A policy u has the following components:
1. u
(1) is the price per sampling an item at the site of the CPI.
u
(2) is the cost payed by the CPI for legal and other measures to dissuade sampling at P2P networks.
Let a(u), the availability of a le in a P2P network, have the following linearized form 2 :
The initial availability of a le increases with the price charged by the CPI, since higher prices make the use of P2P a more attractive alternative. On the other hand, it is negatively aected by the investment made by the CPI on control measures. As reported in [22] and [23] , price is the most important factor in the decision of making P2P sampling over buying music. Even if the CPI uses an aggressive pricing scheme, the eect of price is still important, so α ∞.
Conversely, huge investment on control measures has been largely ineective in reducing availability of music on P2P networks, so β 0. For simulation, it is possible to make α β. This fact was also obtained from analytical consideration in [25] , where it was shown that very popular les see their demand decrease by CPI's measures but not their availability.
Sampling as a branching process
We propose a dynamic model for the sampling: a sample may change the information of the internaute not only on the particular sampled item but also on other related ones. For example, it may increase or decrease its interest in discovering more products by the same artist. This may lead as a result to new sampling by the internaute. We thus assume that as a result of a sample, a demand for a random number of samples is generated. This means that we model the sampling as a branching process.
Assume that the internaute plans initially to use X 1 samples. This is a sample of the rst generation. Sample i of generation n will cause further creation of K (i) n samples. The total number of extra samples is given recursively by X n =
We conclude that the total expected number of samples will be: N = X 1 /(1 − K(u)).
For computation purposes, we shall again use an approximating version of this expression. Using a linear approximation, the expected number of samples N p2p (u) at a P2P network and N cpi (u) at the CPI's site, respectively, as a result of a single initial sample would be:
. We found this approximation unsuitable since it does not model the fact that for small value of u (1) and of u (2) , we may expect a very high value of N cpi and of N p2p , respectively. To obtain this, we used the following nonlinear approximations instead:
Next we present a simple rst order linear model for the sampling probability.
We have:
where C ii ≤ 0 and C ij ≥ 0, p
s (u) is the probability of sampling in a P2P network, and p (2) s (u) is the probability of sampling at the CPI site. Sampling on the CPI site is done by purchasing an electronic version of the song.
We assume that an item is sampled at the CPI's site if it is not available at a P2P network. A successful sample is one in which the requested item was available. The expected amount of successful sampling generated as a result of an initial sampling attempt, at the P2P network and at the the CPI's site, respectively, are given by:
where d is the potential demand for an item. The expected demand for purchase is:
where p s (u) = p (1) s (u)+p (2) s (u) is the probability of sampling, q s is the probability that an item is purchased if sampled, and q n is the probability that an item is purchased if not sampled.
The CPI's income
Sampling generates trac that benets to ISPs. We assume that incomes due to subscription are split in a way that a content provider receives an income proportional to the demand it generates. The proportionality coecient is denoted by c isp . The income of the CPI is thus:
CPI is thus faced with the problem of maximizing R(u) over u. R(u) is given by:
where w is the dierence between the price of selling an item (hard copy) minus the marginal cost to produce it.
Simulation
We take for (1) [26] reports this number per iPod sold). We assume that if the price was zero, users of the CPI site would download at least the same number of songs as in P2P networks, so N cpi (0) = N p2p (0) = 300. This gives k (1) = 7.5 and δ = 30, so N cpi (u (1) = 0.99) 20. With current levels of u, let's assume C 12 0. From [21] we can x p s (u) = (0.7, 0.4). The best case sampling probability should be close to one for the CPI site and not very far from the actual value for P2P networks, so let's use 
Conclusions
We proposed a modelling approach that takes into account various aspects of sampling that could have an impact on the expected income of the CPI. We studied in particular the impact of various strategies of the CPIs. We used read data to trim the parameters of the simplied model (based mainly on rst order approximations). Numerical experiments show that the CPI is better o, in terms of revenues, by abandoning the vast investment in for the prosecution of le sharers.
